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Income volatility—month-to-month changes in a household’s in-
come—creates policy challenges for the administration of federal food 
assistance programs and potential hardship for families. As families 
shift in and out of eligibility, program designers must defi ne eligibility 
rules that effectively target this changing population. And if volatility 
occurs involuntarily, a family might think of it as a short-term problem 
and forgo benefi ts for which they are eligible. 
In this chapter, I examine the dynamic effects of monthly income 
volatility to better understand how it affects low-income populations. 
I also examine the implications of income volatility for household eli-
gibility in the National School Lunch Program (NSLP). The analysis 
contributes to our understanding of the potential impacts of volatility on 
other USDA food assistance programs and on the changing economic 
conditions of low-income households. 
First, I focus on the characteristics of income volatility for house-
holds with children. I compare the distributions of income volatility 
across six income groups using the coeffi cient of variation, a scale-
independent measure of volatility. Then I examine the frequency of in-
come changes occurring around the income-to-poverty ratio threshold 
of 185 percent, the fi gure used in the NSLP and other food assistance 
programs. Following that, I examine descriptive statistics and estimates 
from hazard models to understand which trigger events are most likely 
to explain eligibility changes.
Second, I examine the implications of income volatility for target-
ing effi ciency in the NSLP. As this paper shows, an understanding of the 
interaction between income volatility and eligibility policy sheds light 
on recent concerns about NSLP integrity. A series of studies done in the 
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late 1990s raised concerns about the accuracy of the NSLP application 
and eligibility certifi cation procedures. Estimates of overcertifi cation 
rates—the share of students receiving benefi ts for which they were not 
entitled—ranged from 12 to 33 percent. 
The U.S. Congress recently amended the National School Lunch 
Act (signed into law in 1946) through the Child Nutrition and Women, 
Infants, and Children (WIC) Reauthorization Act of 2004. One of the 
most important changes to eligibility was to extend the eligibility peri-
od from one month to the entire school year. A student is eligible for the 
whole school year if eligible by monthly household income at the time 
of application. Before that, the rules stipulated that households report 
any changes in income and household composition to school authori-
ties. Households seldom reported such changes, and the administrative 
burden would have been signifi cant if they had. Under the old rules, 
schools had to verify the eligibility of a sample of students before De-
cember 15. This was moved up to November 15 in the new rules.
This chapter estimates how income volatility contributed to over-
certifi cation as defi ned under the pre–2004 act regulations. The extent 
to which income volatility contributed to total overcertifi cation is un-
known, but it was always suspected as a source of error. In this chapter, 
I trace how changes in income by month affect eligibility changes of 
initially eligible households. This process allows me to estimate the 
likely effects of income volatility on verifi cation results in December. 
I also estimate how the use of one month of income to determine eligi-
bility (in August) compares with the use of one year of income, which 
better matches the eligibility period under the new law. This allows us 
to understand the importance of another eligibility policy, the ability of 
households to apply throughout the year.
The analysis suggests that households experience substantial in-
come fl uctuations, especially those households that are eligible for 
free or reduced-price NSLP meals. The fl uctuations come largely from 
changes in household labor market participation, and they may explain 
a large amount of overcertifi cation error. The chapter does not estimate 
the size of other types of errors that could also be important, such as er-
rors made by households or administrators. But the evidence on income 
volatility contributes an important piece to the puzzle of what caused 
overcertifi cation error rates in the past. And the analysis of how income 
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volatility affects NSLP eligibility can be extended to other USDA food 
assistance programs.
DATA AND ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA
SIPP: Description and Issue of Seam Bias
I use the 1996 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Partici-
pation (SIPP). Besides the benefi ts of its longitudinal design, SIPP has 
the advantage of supplying monthly rather than annual income. This 
provides the opportunity to analyze income dynamics over a shorter 
time frame than has been common. And for the problem of overcerti-
fi cation in the NSLP, annual data lack the needed detail for identifying 
eligibility changes within a year. The 1996 panel is a four-year panel 
that started in December 1995 and ended in February 2000. 
SIPP has two important disadvantages: 1) attrition and 2) seam bias. 
I use the Census Bureau household weights for each month in order 
to match the initial sample design and control for attrition. The other 
problem, seam bias, occurs in surveys that ask for information from 
differentiated periods in the past. Earnings and total income data are 
susceptible to seam bias error (U.S. Census Bureau 1998).1 However, I 
know of no research that examines the extent of seam bias for earnings 
or income data.2 A common technique to avoid seam bias is to aggre-
gate the monthly data by quarters. This technique is unavailable for this 
paper because I want to understand the differences that occur in very 
short time intervals in order to understand NSLP eligibility changes 
between September and December.
In the 1996 SIPP panel, I fi nd seam bias in the income data. Table 
6.1 shows the median percentage change in income in absolute terms 
by reference month, where the fi rst month of the reference period is the 
month following the seam (Month 1). The magnitude of the percentage 
income change in Month 1 is much greater than the income changes in 
the other months: in Month 1, for each of the three school years exam-
ined, the percentage income change is 17–19 percent; for the other three 
reference months, the percentage income change is 2–6 percent.
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Seam bias creates a type of artifi cial volatility. Reported income 
may jump from one month to the next, either because of some combina-
tion of an actual income change—which I would want to identify to as 
great a degree as possible—or from misreporting at the seam. Using the 
raw, unadjusted data on reported income would result in overestimat-
ing the true extent of volatility. In order to differentiate between true 
income volatility and volatility from misreporting, I need to smooth the 
data in some way. I perform two kinds of adjustments to the data, each 
of which depends on different assumptions about the cognitive causes 
of the seam problem.3 
Based on two fundamental explanations for seam bias error, mem-
ory failure, and inference strategy, I tested two ways of adjusting the 
data to smooth the differences across the seams.4 In the fi rst adjustment, 
I assumed that the income change that was misreported at the seam 
would have been evenly distributed over the fi rst three months in the 
Table 6.1  Medians of the Absolute Percentage Income Change by 
Reference Month: Unadjusted Data, Adjusted Data 1, and 
Adjusted Data 2 (%)
Panel A: Unadjusted data
Reference month
School year Month 1 Month 2 Month 3 Month 4
1996–97 19 3 4 6
1997–98 18 3 4 5
1998–99 17 2 3 4
Panel B: Adjusted data
Reference month
School year Month 1 Month 2 Month 3 Month 4
Adjustment 1 (even distribution)
1996–97 13 3 4 12
1997–98 12 3 4 11
1998–99 11 2 3 10
Adjustment 2 (decreasing distribution)
1996–97 7 9 9 9
1997–98 7 9 8 8
1998–99 7 9 8 8
SOURCE: SIPP 1996 Panel.
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interview period if accurately reported and that the most recent month 
was accurately recalled. This inference strategy is one commonly used 
by interviewees and is referred to as a “constant wave response” (Rips, 
Conrad, and Fricker 2003). In the second adjustment, I assumed a de-
creasing distribution around the seam with a small amount spilling back 
into the last month of the previous period and the rest being distributed 
in decreasing order from the fi rst month of the current reference period 
through the next two months. The cognitive basis for this adjustment is 
simply that respondents cannot pinpoint the exact date of the change. 
It assumes that the respondent knows about when the change occurred 
and that the change probably occurred close to the date reported but 
actually occurred slightly before or sometime afterward.
The effect of the two data adjustments on the measurement of data 
changes at the seams is shown in Table 6.2. The fi rst adjustment does 
not fully remove the apparent seam bias as measured by absolute per-
centage income differences at the seams. The second adjustment, which 
has a decreasing function around the seam, appears to remove the seam 
bias: the absolute percentage income change across periods is fairly 
equal at the seam and within the reference period. In the following anal-
ysis I use the second adjustment for the analysis, and in some parts of 
the analysis I contrast the results using adjusted data with those using 
unadjusted data to show the adjustment effect. 
Eligibility and Sampling Criteria
All children in participating schools can purchase an NSLP lunch at 
full price, and some qualify for reduced-price or free lunches. A student 
is eligible for a free meal if his or her household income is at or below 
130 percent of the federal poverty guideline, and a student is eligible 
for a reduced-price meal if household income is between 130 and 185 
percent of the guideline. If a student’s household receives assistance 
from the Food Stamp Program, from Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families, or from the Food Distribution Program on Indian Reserva-
tions (or if the student is homeless, a migrant, or a runaway), the student 
is categorically eligible for free lunch benefi ts. 
In this study, eligibility is determined strictly by NSLP income lim-
its, ignoring categorical eligibility. I use a pure income defi nition of 
eligibility in order to directly relate eligibility to income volatility. The 
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restriction has little effect: in the SIPP data, less than 1 percent of the 
households that were categorically eligible were ineligible by income.
In the analysis, I often combine eligibility for either a free lunch or a 
reduced-price lunch into one eligible category. One reason for combin-
ing is that it simplifi es the discussion. Another is that the savings to the 
USDA of catching errors related to differences in free and reduced-price 
status are much smaller than the savings from fi nding errors related to 
eligibility for either benefi t. In 2004–2005, the amount reimbursed to 
schools by the USDA was $1.84 for a reduced-price lunch and $2.24 
for a free lunch; both are much larger than the $0.21 reimbursed for a 
paid lunch. 
Table 6.2  Coeffi cient of Variation of Income Data: Distribution by 
Average Monthly Income-to-Poverty Status
Panel A: Unadjusted data
≤ 0.75 0.75–1.30 1.30–1.85 1.85–2.40 2.40–3.00 > 3.00
No. of observations 792 1290 1402 1452 1387 4807
75% 0.77 0.57 0.47 0.41 0.37 0.37
50% (median) 0.52 0.39 0.32 0.28 0.25 0.24
25% 0.32 0.26 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.17
Mean 0.61 0.44 0.38 0.33 0.31 0.31
Std. dev. 0.45 0.28 0.26 0.19 0.24 0.23
Interquartile range 0.45 0.31 0.25 0.21 0.19 0.20
Panel B: Adjusted data
≤ 0.75 0.75–1.30 1.30–1.85 1.85–2.40 2.40–3.00 > 3.00
No. of observations 792 1290 1402 1452 1387 4807
75% 0.68 0.51 0.42 0.36 0.33 0.33
50% (median) 0.45 0.34 0.28 0.25 0.23 0.21
25% 0.27 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.15
Mean 0.53 0.39 0.34 0.29 0.28 0.27
Std. dev. 0.40 0.25 0.23 0.17 0.22 0.20
Interquartile range 0.41 0.29 0.23 0.19 0.17 0.18
NOTE: CV over one year of monthly income data by average income-to-poverty sta-
tus. The average CV in each income-to-poverty status group is signifi cantly different 
from the average CV of all the other groups combined, and each average CV is sig-
nifi cantly different from the average CV in the following and preceding income-to-
poverty groups. The differences are all signifi cant at the 0.01 level.
SOURCE: SIPP 1996 Panel.
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INCOME VOLATILITY ANALYSIS
A 2003 study of poverty dynamics highlights the importance of 
income volatility. In a census report using the 1996 SIPP panel, John 
Iceland (2003) fi nds that the average monthly poverty rates for each 
year in the panel were higher than the corresponding annual poverty 
rates (1996–1999). Other, older studies fi nd that annual poverty rates 
are lower than monthly poverty rates (Coder et al. 1987; Doyle and 
Trippe 1991; Ruggles and Williams 1987a). Stevens (1999) fi nds that 
half of all individuals exiting poverty reenter poverty within four years. 
Using annual data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for the 
years 1967–1988, she concludes that the amount of time spent in pov-
erty has been underestimated by previous work that counted only single 
spells of poverty. She writes, “More than half of all blacks and around 
one-third of whites falling into poverty will spend fi ve or more of the 
next ten years in poverty.” 
Analyses of the dynamics of participation in the USDA’s Food 
Stamp Program (FSP) have highlighted the importance of multiple 
spells of participation. To be eligible for food stamps, an individual 
must have a gross monthly income of 130 percent of the poverty level 
or below (and meet other income and asset tests). Burstein (1993), us-
ing SIPP data from the late 1980s, fi nds that 38 percent of people who 
exit the program reenter within a year. Gleason, Schochet, and Moffi tt 
(1998), also using SIPP, similarly fi nd high FSP reentry levels in the 
early 1990s. They write, “More than half of those who stop receiving 
food stamps reenter the program within two years. . . . Among all in-
dividuals who exit food stamps, one-fourth start receiving food stamps 
again within four months and 42 percent within one year.” 
Income Volatility by Income Group
To compare volatility across income groups, I use the coeffi cient of 
variation (CV), since it measures relative volatility. Each household is 
assigned to one of the six income groups according to the household’s 
average monthly income relative to the monthly poverty line, averaged 
over the number of months the household was in the survey.5 Using the 
55-percentage-point difference between the NSLP eligibility cutoffs at 
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130 and 185 percent of poverty as the yardstick for the three central 
groupings, the groups are broken down as follows: 0–75 percent, 76–
130 percent, 131–185 percent, 186–240 percent, 241–300 percent, and 
301 percent and over.
Figure 6.1 shows the CVs in monthly income across six income 
groups (adjusted for seam bias).6 The graph shows a continuous decline, 
from the poorest group to the richest, in the medians of the groups’ CV 
distributions. Table 6.2 shows that the CVs at the twenty-fi fth and sev-
enty-fi fth percentiles of the distributions decrease for each higher in-
come group. Mean CVs range from 0.27 to 0.53 across income groups, 
and the differences across groups are statistically signifi cant. Whether 
adjusted or unadjusted data is examined, the mean CV of the lowest 
income group is double the mean CV of the highest income group.
Eligibility Status Changes
In this section, I calculate the number of changes in monthly eligi-
bility status within one year and within three years. The frequency of 
changes in eligibility provides a measure of the implications of income 
volatility for administrative burden when schools have to reexamine a 
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household’s eligibility status for any change in income or household 
composition. Even though the rule was not generally enforced, it is 
an indicator of how the year-long eligibility rule reduces the schools’ 
statutory responsibility and the amount of work that would have been 
required to fully enforce the previous law.
For the analysis in this section, I examine the frequency of income 
changes around the 185 percent poverty threshold. A change in status is 
defi ned as either exiting or entering eligibility; in order to get a simple, 
directionless measure, I do not distinguish between the directions of 
change. The reasons for change in one direction or the other may be 
different—and they have been shown to be7—but the frequency of eli-
gibility change itself gives a distilled picture of the effects of volatility. 
I start the year in July because the monthly income for July is the fi rst 
that may be used to determine eligibility if the household applies in 
August.
Figure 6.2 depicts the distribution of eligibility status changes across 
households with children during the 12-month period from July 1998 to 
June 1999. Of those, more than two-thirds (72 percent) never changed 
status. Of the households that changed status, it was just as common for 
them to change one time (9 percent of households) as it was for them to 
change two (9 percent) or three times or more (9 percent). Panel B of 
Figure 6.2 shows the status changes of the households that had at least 
one month of eligibility. This condition effectively narrows the sample 
to a low-income population. Among them, 37 percent had no change 
in status. Somewhat more (43 percent) had one or two status changes, 
while one-fi fth (20 percent) had three or more status changes.
I also examine the number of eligibility changes within each of the 
income groups. As expected, most changes in eligibility status occur 
in the income groups closest to the eligibility limit. In the fi rst income 
group, where average income was less than 75 percent of the poverty 
line, the average number of changes in status was 0.2. For the next in-
come group, between 76 and 130 percent of poverty, the average num-
ber of status changes was 1.2. The two groups closest to the eligibility 
cutoff of 185 percent of poverty had the most changes. For the 131–185 
percent group, the average number of status changes was 4.9, and for 
the 186–240 percent group, it was 5.0. The next two higher categories 
(241–300 percent and 301 percent and up) had an average number of 
changes of 2.2 and 0.6. The average number of 5.0 changes per year for 
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the income group immediately above and the one immediately below 
the 185 percent line reveals how important income volatility can be.
These results are consistent with the previously discussed fi ndings 
of high rates of reentry into the FSP after exiting (Burstein 1993; Glea-
son, Schochet, and Moffi tt 1998) and high rates of reentry into poverty 
after exiting (Stevens 1999). My results, like those cited, point to the 
importance of income volatility in understanding low-income popula-
tion issues.
INCOME VOLATILITY TRIGGER EVENTS
While the previous section examined the magnitude of income vol-
atility, this section investigates the sources of monthly income change 
that cause eligibility change. I use a hazard model to analyze the factors 
associated with entry into, and exit from, NSLP eligibility. This model 
is commonly used in studies of poverty dynamics (Bane and Ellwood 
1986; McKernan and Ratcliffe 2002; Ruggles and Williams 1987b). 
I use a discrete-time hazard model, which can be accurately estimat-
ed with a traditional logit specifi cation (Allison 1984; Jenkins 1995). A 
discrete formulation of the probability is used to account for my data, 
which are in discrete monthly periods. Most studies of poverty and pro-
gram participation dynamics use the discrete-time logit hazard model 
(Stevens 1999; McKernan and Ratcliffe 2002), which is written as
                             
P t
e z t
( ) ( )= + −
1
1
 ,  where z t c t X( ) ( )= + β .  
 
The model of eligibility, z(t), is a function of c(t), the baseline haz-
ard function. Xβ represents the matrix of explanatory factors and their 
respective parameters. The model is estimated by maximum likelihood, 
and I report the odds ratios. I use household weights and correct for 
standard errors using variables provided with SIPP to represent primary 
sampling units (“ghlfsam”) and strata (“gvarstr”).
I report results using eligibility determinations from both seam-
adjusted income and unadjusted income. It is quite likely that seam bias 
exists in many of the independent variables, and rather than trying to 
correct for it where appropriate, I use unadjusted income, since that 
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will show us what factors are at least contemporaneously associated 
(and jointly affected by survey respondents’ memories of when events 
occurred). I also report results using the adjusted income to determine 
eligibility for the case of no seam bias on the right-hand side.
I look at the role of changes in circumstances—trigger events—
as well as static characteristics such as household composition, labor 
force participation, state unemployment rates, and others. The full list 
is shown in Table 6.3, along with the variables’ summary statistics. The 
trigger events are depicted by dummy variables, which equal one when 
a characteristic has changed. Among the trigger variables included are 
increases in total household hours worked and changes in the number of 
jobs held by different members of the household: the reference person, 
that person’s spouse or partner, and other adults (as a composite). The 
number of jobs held is a coarser measure of employment than hours 
worked, and it is used here to identify job changes by household mem-
ber type. The change-in-hours trigger provides an aggregate view of 
household work changes, and the change in the number of jobs held 
by a household member provides a more detailed view of the relative 
importance of jobs held by different members. Because employment 
changes can occur in so many ways in a household, I wanted to in-
clude as many aspects as possible. The results should not be interpreted 
as causal effects, because some of the independent variables may be 
endogenous.
I use changes in fi ve different household wages as trigger dummy 
variables: wages for primary and secondary jobs of the household refer-
ence person, wages for primary and secondary jobs of the spouse, and 
a summed pay rate for all other adults in the house in all of their jobs. 
Wages are measured in one of two ways. The fi rst is a wage reported as 
the regular hourly pay rate, which is separately provided for the primary 
and secondary jobs. The second, which is used only if the fi rst is not 
available, is the sum of monthly gross earnings from the job divided 
by the product of the usual hours worked per week at this job and the 
number of weeks with a job in the month.
For most trigger variables, I allow the effects of a change in a given 
characteristic to be captured by the trigger dummy variables over one 
month. It is common in the literature to allow for delayed effects, but 
I wanted to test the effects of short-term events as much as possible. I 
made an exception for changes in marital status, public assistance re-
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ceipt, disability status, presence or not of a subfamily in the household, 
and changes in the number of children. I thought that the effects of these 
variables, especially those that occur very infrequently, would be too 
hard to capture in one month. For marital status changes, the dummy 
variable for a change is equal to 1 if the change occurred one or two 
months prior to the current observation or if it occurred one month after 
the current observation. For the other types of changes, the dummy vari-
able is equal to 1 if the event occurred in the last one or two months.
The data used for the analysis are from all years and months in 
the 1996 panel. Before any data are excluded, the sample has 436,479 
household-month observations and 20,016 unique households. I exclude 
left-censored spells, the spells cut off at the beginning, but I keep right-
censored spells, spells cut off at the end. The exclusion of left-censored 
spells reduces the sample size considerably and means I examine only 
households that underwent at least one change in eligibility.
The sample is divided into two parts: households that are in spells 
of ineligibility (the entry sample) and households that are in spells of 
eligibility (the exit sample). The exit sample is smaller because fewer 
households have incomes below 131 percent of the poverty line than 
have incomes of 131 percent or above. And the samples differ in size 
depending on the income measure used to defi ne eligibility. Excluding 
left-censored spells of eligibility from the exit sample leaves 65,084 
household-month observations in the adjusted income sample and 
71,066 household-month observations in the unadjusted income sam-
ple. And excluding left-censored spells of ineligibility from the entry 
sample leaves 82,419 household-month observations in the adjusted 
income sample and 87,445 household-month observations in the unad-
justed income sample. Results from the models of NSLP eligibility exit 
and NSLP entry are shown in Tables 6.4 and 6.5.
Exit Results
In the unadjusted income sample (last two columns, Table 6.4), the 
change most associated with exit from eligibility was that of a house-
hold changing from female-headed to married. This variable was not 
signifi cant in the adjusted income sample. In a previous version of this 
analysis (Newman 2006) in which unadjusted income was not used, 
the result that getting married did not lead to exit raised many ques-
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Table 6.3  Summary Statistics for Exit and Entry Model Variables
Exit Entry
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Characteristics (weighted and SE-corrected)
Dependent variable: end/beginning of eligibility spell 0.18 0.00 0.12 0.00
Log of time 1.38 0.02 1.70 0.01
State unemployment rate 4.85 0.03 4.71 0.03
No. of working adults per household member 0.28 0.00 0.42 0.00
No. of school-aged children 1.78 0.02 1.75 0.02
No. of jobs held by household reference person 0.73 0.01 0.88 0.01
No. of jobs held by spouse of reference person 0.38 0.01 0.60 0.01
No. of jobs held by other adults 0.29 0.01 0.54 0.01
Tenure of household reference 0.24 0.07 0.19 0.07
Tenure of spouse or partner 0.68 0.06 0.67 0.04
Tenure of other adults 0.19 0.02 0.13 0.01
Education of reference person 2.71 0.02 3.02 0.02
Education of spouse 1.70 0.03 2.28 0.03
Black/non-Hispanic reference person 0.19 0.01 0.12 0.01
Hispanic reference person 0.18 0.01 0.12 0.01
Native American reference person 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00
Asian reference person 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00
Disabled reference person 0.11 0.00 0.07 0.00
Disabled spouse or partner 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.00
Disabled other adults 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00
Subfamily shares householda 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.00
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Household receives public assistance 0.16 0.01 0.05 0.00
Single female–headed household 0.32 0.01 0.20 0.01
Single male–headed household 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.00
Group home household 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Triggers
Public assistance gained/lost 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00
Reference person left disability rolls/became disabled 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00
Female head of household to married change/married to female 
head of household change
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Child left/entered household 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00
Subfamily added to householda 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Household total hours worked increased/reduced 0.27 0.00 0.33 0.00
Reference person gained one job or more 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00
Spouse/partner gained one job or more 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Other adults gained one job or more 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00
Reference person’s wage from primary job increased/decreased 0.10 0.00 0.15 0.00
Reference person’s wage secondary job increased/decreased 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00
Spouse/partner’s wage primary job increased/decreased 0.08 0.00 0.10 0.00
Spouse/partner’s wage secondary job increased/decreased 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00
Other adults’ wages increased/decreased 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.00
Increased/decreased % of working adults in household 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00
N 71,066 87,445
NOTE: SE = standard error of the odds ratio. The sample used here is the one in which unadjusted income was used to determine eligibil-
ity entry and exit.
a A subfamily is a nuclear family that is either related or not to the household reference person but does not include that person. 
SOURCE: SIPP 1996 Panel.
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Table 6.4  Logit Estimates of the Determinants of NSLP Eligibility Exit
Adjusted income Unadjusted income
Odds ratio SE Odds ratio SE
Characteristics (weighted and SE-corrected)
Log of time 0.66*** 0.01 0.67*** 0.01
State unemployment rate 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.01
No. of working adults per household member 2.20*** 0.22
1.77
*** 0.18
No. of school-aged children 0.92*** 0.02 0.91*** 0.01
No. of jobs held by household reference person 1.20*** 0.03 1.28*** 0.03
No. of jobs held by spouse of reference person 1.23*** 0.04 1.33*** 0.03
No. of jobs held by other adults 1.27*** 0.03 1.32*** 0.03
Tenure of household reference 1.00*** 0.00 1.00*** 0.00
Tenure of spouse or partner 1.00 0.00 1.00*** 0.00
Tenure of other adults 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Education of reference person 1.09*** 0.01 1.09*** 0.02
Education of spouse 1.06*** 0.01 1.05** 0.02
Black/non-Hispanic reference person 0.82*** 0.03 0.80*** 0.03
Hispanic reference person 0.81*** 0.04 0.82*** 0.04
Native American reference person 0.86 0.07 0.86 0.08
Asian reference person 0.73*** 0.07 0.69*** 0.06
Disabled reference person 0.92 0.04 0.91 0.04
Disabled spouse or partner 0.91 0.06 0.93 0.05
Disabled other adults 1.00 0.04 1.03 0.04
Subfamily shares householda 1.07 0.06 1.09 0.06
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Household receives public assistance 0.61*** 0.03 0.59*** 0.03
Single female–headed household 1.00 0.05 0.96 0.05
Single male–headed household 1.13 0.07 1.10 0.06
Group home household 1.18 0.40 1.19 0.33
Triggers
Public assistance gained 0.98 0.11 0.93 0.09
Reference person left disability 1.00 0.06 0.72*** 0.05
Female head of household to married change 1.44 0.34 2.06*** 0.41
Child left household 0.82 0.09 0.82 0.08
Subfamily added to householda 0.93 0.16 0.83 0.13
Household total hours worked increased 1.37*** 0.04 1.37*** 0.04
Reference person gained one job or more 1.12 0.11 0.84 0.08
Spouse/partner gained one job or more 1.03 0.10 0.83 0.08
Other adults gained one job or more 1.00 0.08 0.82** 0.06
Reference person’s wage from primary job increased 1.04 0.04 0.88*** 0.03
Reference person’s wage from second job increased 0.91 0.08 0.75*** 0.06
Spouse’s wage from primary job increased 1.14* 0.06 0.88* 0.04
Spouse’s wage from secondary job increased 0.92 0.10 0.78 0.08
Other adults’ wages increased 1.12 0.06 0.84*** 0.04
Increased % of working adults in household 1.23*** 0.07 1.04 0.06
N 65,084 71,066
NOTE: SE = standard error of the odds ratio. * signifi cant at the 0.10 level; ** signifi cant at the 0.05 level; *** signifi cant at the 0.01 
level.
aA subfamily is a nuclear family that is either related or not to the household reference person but does not include that person.
SOURCE: SIPP 1996 Panel.
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Table 6.5  Logit Estimates of the Determinants of NSLP Eligibility Entry
Adjusted income Unadjusted income
Odds ratio SE Odds ratio SE
Characteristics (weighted and SE-corrected)
Log of time 0.45*** 0.01 0.40*** 0.01
State unemployment rate 0.98 0.01 0.99 0.01
No. of working adults per household member 0.27*** 0.03 0.42*** 0.04
No. of school-aged children 1.01 0.02 1.04 0.02
No. of jobs held by household reference person 0.91*** 0.02 0.95 0.02
No. of jobs held by spouse of reference person 0.94 0.03 0.93 0.03
No. of jobs held by other adults 0.79*** 0.02 0.80*** 0.01
Tenure of household reference 1.00 0.00 1.00*** 0.00
Tenure of spouse or partner 1.00 0.00 1.00* 0.00
Tenure of other adults 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Education of reference person 0.87*** 0.01 0.88*** 0.01
Education of spouse 0.89*** 0.01 0.90*** 0.01
Black/non-Hispanic reference person 1.18*** 0.06 1.17*** 0.05
Hispanic reference person 1.18*** 0.05 1.17*** 0.05
Native American reference person 1.33 0.22 1.41 0.22
Asian reference person 0.95 0.09 0.96 0.08
Disabled reference person 1.00 0.05 1.09 0.05
Disabled spouse or partner 0.94 0.06 1.01 0.06
Disabled other adults 0.89 0.05 0.96 0.05
Subfamily shares householda 0.98 0.06 1.00 0.05
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Household receives public assistance 1.12 0.06 1.13 0.05
Single female–headed household 0.95 0.05 0.92 0.04
Single male–headed household 0.85 0.05 0.85* 0.05
Group home household 0.79 0.26 0.86 0.26
Triggers
Public assistance lost 1.05 0.12 0.94 0.09
Reference person became disabled 1.03 0.11 0.64*** 0.06
Married to female head of household change 3.09*** 0.55 5.50*** 1.03
Child added to household 1.09 0.09 1.05 0.08
Subfamily left householda 0.55* 0.12 0.66 0.13
Household total hours worked reduced 1.54*** 0.03 1.56*** 0.03
Reference person lost one job or more 0.92 0.09 0.51*** 0.06
Spouse/partner lost one job or more 0.78 0.11 0.49*** 0.08
Other adults lost one job or more 0.74** 0.08 0.78 0.08
Reference person’s wage from primary job decreased 1.21*** 0.05 0.87*** 0.03
Reference person’s wage from second job decreased 1.11 0.08 0.86 0.06
Spouse’s wage from primary job decreased 1.11 0.05 0.86*** 0.04
Spouse’s wage from secondary job decreased 1.45*** 0.13 1.16 0.11
Other adults’ wages decreased 1.27*** 0.07 0.84*** 0.05
Decreased % of working adults in household 1.48*** 0.11 1.12 0.09
N 82,419 87,445
NOTE: SE = standard error of the odds ratio. * signifi cant at the 0.10 level; ** signifi cant at the 0.05 level; *** signifi cant at the 0.01 
level.
aA subfamily is a nuclear family that is either related or not to the household reference person but does not include that person.
SOURCE: SIPP 1996 Panel.
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tions. A change in the opposite direction (i.e., a household becoming 
female-headed) was a signifi cant determinant of entry into eligibility, 
so it seemed somewhat odd that the results were asymmetric. Possible 
explanations were suggested, but this new result makes more sense, 
and the fact that getting married is a signifi cant correlate with exiting 
eligibility when using the unadjusted income probably means that the 
timing of events is more in sync. Getting the joint timing right is espe-
cially important for events such as changing household marital status 
since such events are quite infrequent in the data.
In both the adjusted and unadjusted samples, the share of working 
adults in the household had a positive and signifi cant effect on the odds 
of exit. Another signifi cant static variable was the logarithm of time, 
indicating that the likelihood of exit decreased over time. Also, more 
school-aged children per household led to lower odds of exit. More jobs 
for the reference person, spouse or partner, or other adults led to higher 
odds of exit. The working tenure of the reference person and the spouse 
had signifi cant but almost negligible effects on exit. A higher education 
level of the reference person and the spouse led to greater odds of exit. 
Households with a minority reference person had lower odds of exit 
than those with a white reference person. And anyone in the household 
receiving public assistance had lower odds of exit. 
Three trigger events were signifi cant determinants of exit in the ad-
justed income sample: 1) increases in total household hours worked, 
2) increases in the share of working adults in the household, and (less 
signifi cantly) 3) increases in the spouse’s primary wage. In the unad-
justed income sample, the only difference in those three adjusted sam-
ple results from the adjusted sample was that an increase in the share of 
working adults was not signifi cant. More variables were signifi cant in 
the unadjusted sample than in the adjusted sample, such as the change in 
marital status being signifi cant, as mentioned above. And if a household 
reference person left disability, or was no longer disabled, he or she was 
signifi cantly less likely to leave eligibility. One would expect the op-
posite result, but it is possible that the effects of a disability on income 
status are fairly persistent over time. Perhaps, for example, it is hard for 
a newly able person to enter the workforce after some time out. Other 
signifi cant triggers were found in the unadjusted sample, and these too 
had the opposite effect of the one expected, including an increase in the 
reference person’s wages, from either primary or secondary jobs; an 
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increase in the number of jobs held by other adults in the household; an 
increase in other adults’ wages; and an increase in the spouse’s primary 
wages. That these factors made the odds of exit lower than 1 suggests 
that changes in wages and the number of jobs held by other adults are 
unimportant compared to other factors such as the total amount of time 
household members spent working.
Entry Results
The results from the hazard models of entry into NSLP eligibility 
are consistent with the results from the exit models (Table 6.5). As in 
the exit models, a change in marital status was the variable most strong-
ly associated with entry in both the adjusted and unadjusted samples:  in 
this case, the marital-status change is a household change from married 
to female-headed. In both the adjusted and unadjusted samples, the one 
signifi cant household characteristic that was positively associated with 
entry was the race of the reference person being black or Hispanic. The 
signifi cant factors that were negatively associated with entry were the 
log of time, the share of working adults in the household, the number 
of jobs held by the reference person and other adults, the education 
level of the reference person and spouse, and the household being sin-
gle male–headed. All of these effects were signifi cant in the expected 
directions.
Other trigger events that signifi cantly and positively affected the 
odds of entry into eligibility were a reduction in total household hours 
worked; a reduction in the wages of the reference person, the spouse, 
and other adults; and, in the adjusted sample, a reduction in the share of 
working adults in the household. Two negative, signifi cant triggers in 
the adjusted sample were the departure of a subfamily and an increase 
in the number of jobs held by other adults in the household. Negative, 
signifi cant triggers in the unadjusted sample included the loss of a job 
by either the reference person or the spouse and the reference person 
becoming disabled. For all of these negative triggers, it must be re-
membered that they are less likely to lead to entry, meaning that these 
variables are less important than the positive ones. The most positive 
triggers in both samples were the change in household marital status to 
female-headed and the reduction in total household hours worked. A 
decrease in the share of working adults in the household was strongly 
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associated with entry in the adjusted sample, as it was for the result in 
the exit model.
Overall, it would stand to reason that the unadjusted income sample 
is more likely to capture the important correlates, given that many of 
the independent variables are also likely to be affected by seam bias. 
According to results from the unadjusted income exit and entry models, 
the factors most associated with eligibility changes are changes in mari-
tal status and in total household hours worked. While changes in marital 
status occur infrequently in the data, when they do occur they appear to 
make a large difference in household income levels in both directions. 
Changes in hours worked occur much more frequently and are shown 
to be the most important change among the labor force participation 
variables in infl uencing volatility. The other trigger event signifi cant 
in the adjusted sample is a change in the share of working household 
members, but the static share of working household members is signifi -
cant in both samples. Wage changes and changes in the number of jobs 
per member appear to be unrelated to entry or exit. The results for labor 
market variables point to the relative importance of changes in total 
labor market participation at the household level as opposed to changes 
in labor market participation by a particular household member. 
NSLP ELIGIBILITY AND INCOME VOLATILITY
In this section, I examine the effects of income volatility on eligi-
bility under the pre-2004 rules for eligibility in the NSLP. Since 1981, 
schools have been required to verify the eligibility status of NSLP 
benefi ciaries. Before 2004, schools did so by asking for proof of cur-
rent income from a sample of recipients by December 15 of each year 
(changed to November 15 in 2004). The percentage of students found 
in the verifi cation process to have received benefi ts that they were not 
entitled to, based on their December incomes, was referred to as the rate 
of overcertifi cation error. 
Studies in the 1990s raised concerns that the rate of overcertifi ca-
tion error was somewhere between 15 and 27 percent (St. Pierre et al. 
1990; USDA 1997, 1999). One study found, however, that the overcer-
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tifi cation rate was only around 2 percent (Neuberger and Greenstein 
2003). The USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service launched more in-depth 
studies in the early 2000s to better understand the problem. In one of 
these, Gleason et al. (2003) found an estimated range of error of 12–33 
percent: 12 percent under the assumption that nonresponding house-
holds were eligible, and 33 percent if nonresponding households were 
not eligible. 
In several studies, income volatility was predicted to be an impor-
tant determinant of NSLP eligibility dynamics. A 1992 study of house-
hold NSLP eligibility found that changes resulting from income and 
household composition changes were about 3 percent per month (St. 
Pierre and Puma 1992). A more recent study by Burghardt, Silva, and 
Hulsey (2004) assessed the verifi cation results from a sample of 21 
large metropolitan schools. They estimated that as much as 30–40 per-
cent of the difference in household eligibility among respondents at the 
time of verifi cation could be explained by changes in household income 
or household composition.
Income Changes Likely To Be Detected at Verifi cation
Next, I examine the possible effects of volatility on verifi cation 
fi ndings. The purpose is to identify the extent to which income volatil-
ity may have accounted for verifi cation error rates under the regulations 
in effect until 2004. Specifi cally, I count how many of the households 
eligible in August were still eligible for the same benefi ts in subsequent 
months. I look separately at three school years, 1996–1997, 1997–1998, 
and 1998–1999. In this section, I look at eligibility for free and reduced-
price lunches, both together and separately. I combine them for reasons 
previously discussed, and I separate them in order to understand how 
much of the change in status was due to changes across these catego-
ries. I show the results from both the unadjusted data and the seam-bias-
adjusted data, but I discuss only the adjusted results.
These results do not take into account possible household choices 
about whether to apply for the program or not, given the household’s 
income situation, so the results represent solely the effect of income 
volatility if all income-eligible (at the time of application) households 
participate. Additionally, I assume that all eligible households were cor-
rectly certifi ed at the start of the year. Thus, the analysis examines the 
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extent to which income volatility for eligible households alone may 
account for overcertifi cation.
Households can become eligible again in this counting frame-
work—that is, households that become ineligible in one month are not 
excluded from the sample. Given the number of changes in eligibility 
we saw earlier, some households are known to be cycling in and out of 
eligibility status over the course of a year.8
Table 6.6 shows estimates from each different school year of the 
share of initially eligible households that are ineligible in each subse-
quent month of the school year. December is highlighted to show the 
share of initially eligible households that had become ineligible by the 
month of verifi cation.
When I use adjusted income data, we see that, as expected, the 
share of households that became ineligible is lower month-by-month 
than in the unadjusted data.9 The adjusted percentages for September 
for the three consecutive school years are 13.7, 11.8, and 7.2 percent. 
The data for December for the three school years are 19.5, 18.4, and 
16.8 percent.
What about the error related to households eligible for free lunches 
becoming eligible for only reduced-price lunches by December? This 
change in eligibility is considered an overcertifi cation error because it 
entails an unwarranted payment of benefi ts. Results from the adjusted 
income series show that, in the 1996–1997 school year, 9.4 percent of 
households that were eligible for free lunches in August were eligible 
for only reduced-price lunches by December (Table 6.7). For the next 
two years, the share was 8.2 and 7.9 percent.
Combining the two types of errors, which would lead to a benefi t 
reduction or termination in December verifi cations under the old law, 
I estimate the overcertifi cation error for the three school years at 28.9, 
26.6, and 24.7 percent, or an average of 26.7 percent. These estimates 
are notable when compared with the estimates of errors found in the 
December verifi cations discussed above. My estimate of ineligibility 
stemming from an income volatility of 27 percent constitutes a large 
percentage of the high-end estimate of total error of 33 percent. Since I 
do not estimate the effects of participation that income volatility might 
also affect, this estimate may be upwardly biased.
I examine how changes in a household’s month-to-month eligibility 
status differ from its original eligibility status—reduced-price or free 
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Table 6.6  Percentage Ineligible in Months Following August 
Ineligible by the 
following month
August-eligible 1996–97 August-eligible 1997–98 August-eligible 1998–99
No adjustment Seam-adjusted No adjustment Seam-adjusted No adjustment Seam-adjusted
September 15.6 13.7 13.9 11.8 8.7 7.2
October 14.4 12.9 14.3 13.1 13.1 11.1
November 19.0 17.6 22.2 21.1 18.6 17.0
Decembera 21.1 19.5 19.2 18.4 17.9 16.8
January 20.7 20.3 20.9 19.8 19.1 19.0
February 22.8 22.1 24.5 23.8 20.3 20.0
March 23.2 23.0 21.9 21.6 19.5 18.8
April 21.9 22.2 22.2 22.0 20.9 20.6
May 22.4 23.1 23.9 23.5 24.3 23.8
June 26.3 25.9 25.7 25.3 22.7 22.5
July 22.7 23.3 23.2 23.2 23.8 23.6
aDecember is set off in bold because this is the month when incomes were typically verifi ed (before the 2004 change in the law).
SOURCE: SIPP 1996 Panel
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lunch—using the adjusted data. Most of the households that became 
ineligible in the months immediately after August had been eligible for 
the reduced-price lunch. For example, in the 1996–1997 school year, 
80.3 percent of households that were ineligible in September were 
households that had been in the reduced-price-meal category in August. 
In the other years, 79.3 and 70.0 percent of households that were in-
eligible in September had been eligible for the reduced-price lunch the 
month before. The preponderance of reduced-price households among 
the households that crossed the 185 percent income threshold is logical 
because these households were closest to the threshold. 
Annual versus Monthly Eligibility Determination
Schools use monthly income most often to determine household eli-
gibility at the time of application. This was the case under the old rules 
and still is under the new rules. Households apply for program benefi ts 








Ineligible by the 
following month
% of free eligible 
that went to 
RP-eligible
% of free eligible 
that went to 
RP-eligible
% of free eligible 
that went to 
RP-eligible
September 7.2 6.9 4.5
October 6.8 6.0 7.1
November 8.9 9.1 8.2
Decembera 9.4 8.2 7.9
January 9.2 8.3 9.2
February 10.9 9.4 10.1
March 10.3 7.7 9.3
April 10.1 8.7 10.5
May 10.1 9.2 11.0
June 11.3 9.6 9.9
July 10.8 9.1 10.6
aDecember is set off in bold because this is the month when incomes were typically 
verifi ed (before the 2004 change in the law).
SOURCE: SIPP 1996 Panel
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based on one month of income under the tacit assumption that monthly 
income is a good predictor of annual income. One would imagine that 
its power as a predictor would decline the more variable it was over 
the year. To explore the power of one month of income as a predictor 
in the context of NSLP eligibility, I compare estimates of eligibility 
using August income alone against estimates of eligibility based on an-
nual income reported in the following months of the school year (using 
adjusted data). I do not think that August has any particular seasonal 
properties; any single month’s income would provide similar results. 
Table 6.8 allows us to view the complete overlap of the two catego-
ries of eligibility, determined by month and by year. Looking at the fi rst 
section of the table, which shows the cross-tabulations for August 1996 
and the school year 1996–1997, I see that the share of households eli-
gible from the annual calculation is 33.8 percent. In contrast, the share 
of households eligible from the August (monthly) calculation is 29.9 
percent, about 4 percentage points lower. Similarly, for the other two 
years, the August calculation is lower by about 3 percentage points in 
1997–1998 and by almost 5 percentage points in 1998–1999.
In 1996–1997, of the households that were annually eligible, the 
monthly determination of eligibility counted 68.9 percent of them as 
eligible, whereas for the households annually ineligible, the monthly 
determination was closer—it counted 90.1 percent of them as ineligible. 
There are many more households above the eligibility limit, and thus, 
for them, one month of income is more likely to be representative of an-
nual earnings. Italicized numbers in Table 6.8 show the results of ana-
lyzing the monthly cross-tabulations. In 1996, 78 percent of households 
that were eligible in August were also annually eligible; in that same 
year, 85 percent of households that were ineligible in August were also 
annually ineligible. The single-month determination appears to be bet-
ter at capturing annually ineligible than annually eligible households. 
The same pattern was repeated in the other two years.
A household’s income from a single month can be very different 
from its annual average income because of volatility. To the extent that 
households are not aware of their ability to apply for NSLP benefi ts 
throughout the year, using monthly income to determine eligibility 
could lead to a lower certifi cation rate than that which would come from 
using annual income, which more accurately matches the certifi cation 
period of a year. This outcome suggests that it is important for schools 
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Table 6.8  Monthly (August) vs. Annual Eligibility Determinations: 
Two Categories of Eligibility over Three School Years
Annual 1996–97
Ineligible Eligible Totals
August 1996 Ineligible 85.0 15.0 100.0
90.1 31.1 70.1
Eligible 22.0 78.0 100.0
9.9 68.9 29.9




August 1997 Ineligible 86.6 13.4 100.0
90.5 29.4 70.7
Eligible 21.9 78.1 100.0
9.5 70.6 29.3




August 1998 Ineligible 86.2 13.8 100.0
92.4 32.3 73.5
Eligible 19.6 80.4 100.0
7.6 67.7 26.5
Totals 68.6 31.4 100.0
100.0 100.0 100.0
NOTE: Annual income uses data from months July to June of each respective school 
year. Italicized numbers show the results of analyzing the monthly cross-tabulations.
SOURCE: SIPP 1996 Panel
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to emphasize to families that they can apply for benefi ts at any time of 
the year.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I fi nd that income volatility among households with 
children can cause frequent shifts in school lunch program eligibility. 
Using the coeffi cient of variation of monthly income, I fi nd that lower-
income households unequivocally have more volatile incomes than 
higher-income households do. I also fi nd that, among households with 
children that were eligible for the school lunch program in at least one 
month of a year, almost two-thirds (63 percent) had one or more transi-
tions into or out of eligibility, and that one-fi fth (20 percent) had three 
or more transitions. Households with children whose average monthly 
income fell between 130 percent and 240 percent of poverty crossed the 
eligible line fi ve times per year on average.
In hazard models of eligibility exit and entry, the most important 
factors were changes in household marital status (married or female-
headed), changes in the total household hours worked in a month, and 
changes in the share of working adults in the household. I obtained the 
standard results with respect to static household-level determinants that 
one would expect in a model of poverty dynamics. For example, great-
er education levels led to higher chances of exit from eligibility, and 
households with black or Hispanic reference people were less likely to 
exit than those with white reference people. Corresponding results were 
obtained for the entry model.
In terms of the effects of income volatility on participation in the Na-
tional School Lunch Program, I found that up to one-fi fth of households 
that were eligible in August for either a reduced-price or a free lunch 
in the NSLP became ineligible in the following month of September. 
Moreover, the share of August eligibles that were ineligible increased 
through December to 27 percent on average. In the literature on certi-
fi cation errors, estimates of overcertifi cation differ widely, with the ex-
tremes ranging from 12 to 33 percent. My estimate of overcertifi cation 
of 27 percent in December from income volatility alone is higher than 
most estimated overcertifi cation rates. However, an important qualifi er 
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to these results is that I had to assume that all households participate 
if eligible and that all certifi cations are made correctly. I conclude that 
income volatility has the potential to explain a large portion of NSLP 
overcertifi cation error but that the exact amount is unknown.
I found that a certifi cation process that uses a single month’s income 
produces systematically fewer eligible households than a certifi cation 
process that uses annual income. A single month’s determination is 
more likely to err in the direction of ineligibility because of volatility. 
Since the Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act of 2004 ex-
tended NSLP eligibility through the school year, income volatility will 
no longer affect NSLP eligibility. However, it remains an important is-
sue to other USDA food assistance programs. The evidence here shows 
that income volatility is relatively higher for low-income households 
and that it is strongly linked to monthly changes in the characteristics 
of a household’s labor force participation and marital status. For USDA 
food assistance programs, the volatility associated with low-income 
working households will become an increasing challenge to program 
administration.
Notes
This chapter is a revised and shortened version of a report published by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service (Newman 2006).
 1.  Seam bias occurs when the differences in reported values for a given variable are 
much greater between time periods in which there is a break in survey adminis-
tration than between time periods reported within a survey administration. For 
example, in SIPP, each time a survey respondent is visited to report his or her 
information, the respondent is asked to report about the past four months, one 
month at a time. The differences in variable values within the four months tend 
to be much smaller than the difference between the last month reported and the 
next month reported when the survey respondent is visited for the second round 
of questioning. This is referred to as seam bias, since it is a bias that occurs at the 
“seams” of reported information.
 2. Research on the extent of seam bias has focused on how it affects estimates of 
program participation transition data (Doyle, Martin, and Moore 2000; see U.S. 
Census Bureau [1998] for a review).
 3. I also tested other ways of adjusting and organizing the data that are not dis-
cussed here, such as using only the most recent month of data (the fourth reference 
month) and using three-month intervals that skip the seam instead of four-month 
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intervals. Both methods provided similar evidence of income volatility, as I show 
later.
 4. See Kalton and Miller (1991), Marquis and Moore (1989), and Rips, Conrad, and 
Fricker (2003) for analysis of the cognitive roots of seam bias.
 5. I include all households that were in the survey for 12 months or more in order 
to maximize observations (11,135). The median number of months in the survey 
for those in the survey 12 months or more was 31 months, and 39 percent of the 
households were in for the maximum of 36 months. The results are similar, if 
not more pronounced, when using the smaller sample sizes of households in the 
survey for 24 months or more (7,195 households) or in the survey for 36 months 
(4,333 households).
 6. The same diagram using unadjusted data shows qualitatively the same result of 
lower CVs at higher income-to-poverty levels. But the unadjusted data show high-
er CVs for all groups than do the adjusted data, as expected. 
 7. See the next section, “Income Volatility Trigger Events,” and McKernan and 
Ratcliffe (2002).
 8. In other words, these are not life tables of the percentage of households with chil-
dren who become ineligible by a certain month and are treated as no longer at risk 
for reentry or reexit in following months. Instead, these tables are a tally of ineli-
gibility in any month, inclusive of those who may have reexited and reentered. 
This analysis is designed to estimate what percentage of households with children 
can be expected to be ineligible if a verifi cation sample of these households is 
conducted in various months.
 9. The data reverses in the 1996–1997 school year for some months after April in 
that the share from the adjusted data exceeds the share from the unadjusted data. I 
am not entirely sure why these adjustments would yield higher estimates in some 
cases. The differences, however, are not large enough that the 95-percent confi -
dence intervals of each estimate do not also contain the other estimates.
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